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It is perhaps natural that those studying religious and philosophical “traditions”
in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are eager to highlight and overcharge
with meaning any respective policy, comment or hint coming from the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP). What is more surprising – and much more telling – is
that those studying the CCP have come to think of “traditions” as an important
aspect for deciphering how the party works and how it runs China. Such
deciphering attempts are notoriously difficult in light of the CCP’s secretive
nature; therefore academics have been more than happy to leave this field of
inquiry to experts in think tanks and to journalists relying on their “sources”.
Looking at this body of literature, the topic of traditions and the role they play
for the CCP has clearly gained in importance in recent years. In fact, while
Richard McGregor (formerly with the Financial Times) has had very little to say
about traditions in his 2010 bestseller The Party: The Secret World of China’s
Communist Rulers,1 Rowan Callick (the Asia-Pacific editor for The Australian)
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1 The little he said, however, was pointing towards a new importance: “To buttress its legiti-
macy, the Party has also cloaked itself in Chinese governing traditions. The revival of Confucius
in the last decade, the ancient sage reviled under Mao as a symbol of backward feudalism, and
the methodical refurbishing of other cultural canons, is symbolic of a broader trend, of the Party
re-packaging its rule as a natural continuum of the most enlightened eras of China’s imperial
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devotes no less than an entire chapter to the topic in his 2013 report The Party
Forever: Inside China’s Modern Communist Elite.
Callick stresses the fact that, beyond a wide-spread belief in China’s golden
future, Chinese citizens differ much in how to achieve that future: “They believe
in the family, in their teachers and professors, in owning property, in Christian-
ity, in Buddhism, in Confucius, in Mao, in good health, in good luck, in travel.
And they can pursue all of these beliefs, in moderation – and as long as they do
so along the signposted routes.”2 Indeed, Callick adds, the staunchly atheist
party has become more tolerant given that “it is better to permit and control
religious behavior than to let it flourish dangerously underground”.3 Focusing
his remarks on Christianity and on Confucianism, Callick sees the party being
skeptical about the former – and about religion in general – while partially
supporting the latter, since it is “safer” and “fits more comfortably with Beijing’s
twenty-first-century focus on quality of life, balanced development, and social
cohesion”.4 Furthermore, Christianity is of foreign origin, while Confucianism is
indigenous to China. As for the skepticism about Christianity, Callick relates the
story of an Italian orchestra, set to perform Bach’s St. Matthew Passion. Appar-
ently, the orchestra was told that the music was fine but that in order to pass the
censorship, all references to Jesus and God better be purged from the lyrics.5 On
29 September 2013, Reuters journalists Benjamin Kang Lim and Ben Blanchard,
basing their news on statements by “three independent sources with ties to the
leadership”, reported that Xi Jinping, the new president, is willing to bestow on
“China’s ‘traditional cultures’ or faiths – Confucianism, Buddhism and
Taoism” – a special moral role in the fight against corruption. In that same
report, they also speculate that Xi and his family “have feelings for Buddhism”.6
If this gossip were true, then we would have to start giving serious consideration
to the more general question of the influence of traditions over individual party
members, from the Central Bureau down to local officials, running the whole
history. With no ideology left to speak of, selective historical antecedents provide single-party
rule with an indigenous imperial lustre” (McGregor, 2011: 32–33). Yet, there is no mention, e.g.
of Christianity or Buddhism in McGregor’s book, and religion only emerges as a topic in the
context of the State Council’s knock down of the US direct sales giant Amway and suspected
Falun Gong activities. McGregor comments that “the Party’s management” of religion, NGOs
and also of Amway “is founded on the same principle, to prevent them developing into rival
centres of power” (McGregor, 2011: 211).
2 Callick 2013: 132.
3 Callick 2013: 133.
4 Callick 2013: 134.
5 Callick 2013: 134.
6 Lim/Blanchard 2013.
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gamut of “surreptitious believers”, “hardline opponents” and several “pragma-
tists”.7 The party and its take on traditions is therefore, from the point of view of
contemporary politics, certainly a most timely object of academic study.
More recently, the contours of Xi Jinping’s take on traditions have emerged
more clearly, as party discourse became dominated by anti-Western polemics, re-
deployment of Marxism-Maoism and a conscious embrace of Chinese tradition
tout court. In a much noted speech in front of the members of the International
Confucian Association (printed in Renmin Ribao on 25 September 2014) and on the
occasion of their celebration of the 2565th birthday of Confucius, Xi had of course
something good to say about Confucianism, but the most prominent notion clearly
was “China’s traditional culture” (Zhongguo chuantong wenhua 中国传统文化).
The most interesting part of Xi’s speech was his characterization of the members
of the Communist Party of China as Marxists who are “neither historical nihilists,
nor cultural nihilists” (bu shi lishi xuwuzhuyi zhe, ye bu shi wenhua xuwuzhuyi zhe
不是历史虚无主义者也不是文化虚无主义者). Even more to the point are Xi’s
assertions of “contemporary China as the continuation and development of the
China of the past” (dangdai Zhongguo shi lishi Zhongguo de yanxu he fazhan 当代
中国是历史中国的延续和发展), of “the ideology and culture of contemporary
China as the continuation and sublimation of traditional Chinese ideology and
culture” (dangdai Zhongguo sixiang wenhua ye shi Zhongguo chuantong sixiang
wenhua de chuancheng he shenghua 当代中国思想文化也是中国传统思想文化的
传承和升华), of “the central elements of Chinese ideology and culture having
formed the fundamental cultural genes of the nation” (zhe xie sixiang wenhua...
qizhong zui hexin de neirong yijing chengwei Zhonghua minzu zui jiben de wenhua
jiyin 这些思想文化... 其中最核心的内容已经成为中华民族最基本的文化基因),
and of “the Chinese communists as all along faithful inheritors and promoters
of the country’s outstanding cultural traditions” (Zhongguo gongchandangren
shizhong shi Zhongguo youxiu chuantong wenhua de zhongshi jicheng zhe he
hongyang zhe 中国共产党人始终是中国优秀传统文化的忠实继承者和弘扬者). In
a presentation entitled “Weaving Confucianism into the CCP’s Political Discourse
– Reevaluation or Instrumental Use” delivered in October 2014 in Ljubljana,
Mugur Zlotea of Bucharest University meticulously analyzed Xi Jinping’s speech
and noted that the president avoided the name of Confucianism whenever he
could and was quick to emphasize that Confucianism is but one of many Chinese
traditions whenever he could not avoid mentioning it explicitly.
While several articles, books and special issues in academic journals on the
issue of the Party’s usage of traditions have already been published, our special
section differs from all of them in its primary focus. For example, the China
7 Callick 2013: 134.
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Perspectives’ issue 2009/4 on “Religious Configurations in the People’s Republic
of China” centered on how religion is now more openly acknowledged and how
it has been bestowed with a more positive role by the CCP, trying to understand
the complex forms of these new practices of religious configurations; the later
issue of China Perspectives 2011/1 on “The National Learning Revival” analyzed
in depth the association of guoxue (Traditional Learning) with a Confucian
revival, trying to capture the different facets of it. In contrast, our special
number seeks to shift the emphasis to the category of tradition. Traditions are
an important object of study not only due to their current revival, which is a
remarkable and interesting fact as such, but also because their political use in
the PRC is highly ambiguous. For the CCP, they are a powerful political resource,
but they also challenge the Party’s self-presentation. This ambivalence does not
only apply to religious or philosophical traditions, but perhaps just as much to
the traditions of Marxism or Maoism, say, as potential obstacles to change and
innovation. All this indicates that the politicization of tradition is a contested
and sensitive process, in which the limits and justifications for the promotion of
certain traditions seem to be under constant negotiation.
The ambivalence of tradition
In theory, the CCP has entertained a remarkably antagonistic relationship with
“tradition”, culminating in the Cultural Revolution decade, as the time in which
traditions and customs had to be eradicated and destroyed at all costs; in reality,
early statements by Mao Zedong and others clearly point towards a more check-
ered history than what hardliners would like to admit. But with the death of Mao
and the ensuing opening and reform policies by Deng Xiaoping and his successors,
“traditions” have re-emerged as a factor for the party to reckon with both practi-
cally as well as in ideological terms. Throughout the CCP’s volatile history, when-
ever it seemed appropriate to tame dogmatic antagonism, Marxist theorists have
come up with ever different ways of coming to terms with what might be useful
about “traditions”, despite their general backward orientation. In his 2008 study of
Confucianism in contemporary Chinese academic discourse, John Makeham lists
several such theoretical attempts under the following labels: “accentuate the
positive, eliminate the negative”, “abstract inheritance”, “selecting the constant
way”, “critical transcendence”, and “critical inheritance and synthetic creation”.8
From this point of view, “tradition” is a well-established category in CCP
8 Makeham 2008: 242–250.
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discourse – and it does not matter which specific tradition is juxtaposed to the
party and its concerns; that it is a tradition is enough to be of concern.
Tradition, it turns out, is a rather ambivalent issue for the CCP. The Party’s
handling of philosophical and religious traditions demonstrates this. On the one
hand, the CCP applies references to traditions as a main resource for its commu-
nication on domestic and foreign policy issues. Examples are the use of Confucius
as a Soft Power strategy, the reference to Confucianism in the context of cadre
discipline, the labeling of temples and religious festivals as “cultural heritage” or
the welcome, philanthropic commitment of Buddhist groups to social work and
health care, relieving the State of some burdens. Yet, on the other hand, there is a
tension between the party’s projected image of itself as China’s “modernizing-
progressive force” and its “traditional” conception of religious and philosophical
traditions as “backwards”, “feudal” and “superstitious”. Episodes such as the
removal of the Confucius statue from Tiananmen Square, the repeated statement
(Zhu Weiqun朱维群, Quanguo zhengxie minzu zongjiao weiyuanhui zhuren全国政
协民族宗教委员会主任, in: Qiushi 求实 2011) that “party members cannot be
religious believers” (while entrepreneurs can be party members since 2002), and
occasional crackdowns of “evil cults”, Protestant house churches, and more
recently, in 2014, even officially recognized Christian churches across Zhejiang
province, as well as the continuing restriction of religious practice in Tibet and
Xinjiang, highlight the Party’s ambivalence in the usage of philosophical and
religious references. It is in this sense that the focus on what we call the
“politicization of traditions” may allow for revealing analyses of a specific aspect
of the CCP’s ideological discourse. This is especially so, because when it comes to
the problem of tradition(s), the ideological positioning of the CCP is much less
coherent than the apparently-monolithic party communication would suggest. It
means that the tension between the Party’s self-conception and the religious/
philosophical traditions renders the politicization of traditions a highly sensitive
process, in which the limits of the reference to philosophical and religious tradi-
tions are endlessly contested and stretched. The ensuing organization of party
discourse thus crumbles precisely when the political recourse to traditional
resources collides with the socialist self-understanding of the party or when that
self-understanding is stretched to accommodate philosophical and religious refer-
ences in order to fit the broader realpolitik agenda.
However, the problem of politicizing traditions is not confined to religion and
philosophy. The significance of Marxism-Maoism is no less contested within the
Party. To what degree it should serve as a guideline for current policy decisions or
rather as a “tradition” of sorts, meaning that it still might be of value for shaping
the Party’s official discourse even though it belongs to the past, Party officials are
unclear about. This implies that references to Marxism-Maoism might occasionally
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appear as just as much a “backward”-oriented hindrance for the actual develop-
ment of the country as any other tradition; at the same time, references to Marx-
ism-Maoism still serve the purpose of legitimizing different political goals. In this
regard references to Marxism-Maoism seem to be just as ambivalent as references
to religious or philosophical traditions.
This leads to a series of fundamental questions: how far can references to
traditions go without assuming the identity of that tradition, say, of turning the
Chinese Communist Party into the Chinese Confucian Party (CCP)? How is the
above-mentioned ambivalence framed in ideological terms? How is the tension
between Marxism and religious/philosophical traditions solved? What are the
possibilities and limits of transforming Marxism-Maoism from a party-program
into a tradition?
Tradition as a research focus
The problem of tradition has been addressed in different ways, and differently in
different disciplines, most prominently concerning religious and philosophical
traditions as for instance the revival of religious activities at the grassroots level
or of Confucianism in political discourse. In contrast, the papers dealing with
the problem of religious and philosophical traditions in this special section are
not primarily interested in the adaption of those traditions to the CCP’s shifting
policies. Instead they focus on the opposite process, which could be termed “the
party’s adaption to the revival of religious and Confucian traditions”. André
Laliberté analyzes in his article how the Party adapts to the trend of enforced
religious activity through the expansion of regulatory mechanisms. The paper by
Philipp Hetmanczyk deals with the question of how this space – opened up by
the government for the activity of religious traditions – has been included in the
Party’s ideological constructions. Finally, Nele Noesselt analyzes the synthesis
of the references to Confucian tradition with Chinese Marxism and Maoism as
means of a legitimization strategy for the Party.
The emphasis that has hitherto been given to the religious revival and
political Confucianism has turned a blind eye to the fact that the CCP’s ambiva-
lent relation to “tradition” also applies to Chinese Marxism. On this reading,
Chinese Marxism appears to be at the same time a resource of political legit-
imization and an obstacle for the party’s opening policy, irrespective of whether
the latter aspect concerns the political integration of capitalism, Confucianism or
religion. Therefore the process of turning Marxism into a tradition deserves
special attention, since it not only renders the Party’s historical progressive
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view on achieving a communist modernity a mere reference to the past, but it
also needs to be modeled according to actual political goals. On this regard,
Giorgio Strafella focuses his contribution on the Party’s discursive strategy of
constructing a Marxist tradition, with the purpose of justifying policy changes
while overcoming factional struggles.
Making use of the concept of tradition allows transcending intra-disciplinary
discourses on the party and its respective take, say, on Marxism, on Buddhism
or on Confucianism. Our suggestion is that the party grapples with each of these
traditions for no other reason than that each is precisely that: a tradition, while
trying to find a way to turn the ideological problem into a political resource for
its own purposes. An excellent study taking tradition (and history) as a funda-
mental category to analyze Chinese politics is Jyrki Kallio’s Tradition in Chinese
Politics.9 Kallio explains the turn to tradition in terms of an effort on the side of
the Communist Party “to anchor its right to rule to something more permanent
than economic growth”10 and leaves no doubt about the effort being made from
taking “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” more towards a “Chinese tradi-
tion with socialist characteristics”.11 The general thrust of Kallio’s study is a
sustained argument that instead of guoxue being the midwife for a Confucian
revival, Confucianism is revived in an attempt to make guoxue and, even more to
the point, Chinese tradition serve an important function in legitimizing the
party’s right to rule.12 Kallio’s study also features an interesting example for
the variety of actors (and agendas) involved in the politicization of tradition in a
section on the Guodian texts (a set of texts on bamboo discovered in 1993) and
scholarly attempts to reset the focus from “studying the classics” to “political
action” (as suggested by Liang Tao).13 Whatever the merits of the arguments
given by Liang and others, Kallio points out that the Guodian texts appear at
least partly to be “coloured by political instrumentalization” and it is “no
wonder, then, that interpreting the texts today has become a politicized issue”.14
Still, there is no denying that there are important differences between and
among contending versions of traditions. The potential for constituting a poli-
tical challenge to the Party’s rule is merely one of them. Making cuts to
St. Matthew’s Passion in somebody’s eyes certainly seems a politically sensitive
9 Kallio 2011.
10 Kallio 2011: 7.
11 Kallio 2011: 8; 125.
12 Kallio 2011: 125–129.
13 Cf. Kallio 2011: 111.
14 Kallio 2011: 114.
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thing to do, while the chanting of slogans taken from the Confucian Analects
appears to be politically innocuous. What is more, any academic treatment of
the question about the CCP’s position on traditions is of course also likely to be
informed by concepts of “tradition” beyond the context of the Party and its
history. If the title of this special section, “The CCP and the Politicization of
Tradition”, includes a reference to politicization, then this is because we assume
traditions to be always immersed within some changing political context. It
should be emphasized that our understanding is not one of immaculate tradi-
tion, which for some devious reason suddenly becomes politicized. That a
tradition is politicized is not what this special section is interested in; the
interest rather lies with the question of how it is politicized, by whom, with
what motives and in which ways. This interest, it is needless to say, points far
beyond what is possible to cover with a few contributions. It is, however, our
hope that the presented contributions may help fill in some important pieces
into this much larger puzzle.
The papers assembled in the present special section hark back to earlier
versions presented at a workshop held in June 2013 at the University of Zurich,
which was greatly supported by the University Research Priority Program (URPP)
Asia and Europe and the Institute of Asian and Oriental Studies. We also note
with gratitude the generous financial support of the Graduate Campus of the
University of Zurich. It is thanks to them that this special section has been made
possible.
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